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EMPLOYER DUTIES AND DEFENSES TO OSHA VIOLATIONS
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19701 (hereinafter the Act)
was designed to encourage both employers and employees to reduce the
number of occupational safety and health hazards at their places of em-
ployment.2 The Secretary of Labor is authorized by the Act to set
mandatory standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate com-
merce,3 and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission was
created to handle the adjudication arising from enforcement of the Act.4
An employer's duties under the Act are to provide employees a work en-
vironnent "free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to his employees," 5 and to conform
to the specific health and safety standards promulgated by the Secretary.6
When an employer is charged with a violation under the Act, there are
a number of defenses available regardless of the charge. In several cases
involving occupational healtti, emloyers have attacked various aspects of
the cited standard itself, notably its economic or, technological in-
feasibility.7 Other defenses recognized by the Commission are impossibil-
ity of compliance, greater hazard by compliance, and isolated employee
misconduct. In addition, the common law defenses of collateral estoppel
and res judicata have also been successfully argued before the
Commission.5
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
2. Id. § 651(b)(1). This is accomplished generally "by encouraging employers and employ-
ees in their efforts to reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards at their
places of employment, and to stimulate employers and employees to institute new and to
perfect existing programs for providing safe and healthful working conditions." Id.
3. Id. § 651(b)(3). See also id. § 655. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) is the agency within the Department of Labor responsible for promulgating and
enforcing standards under the Act. In this comment, "OSHA" and "the Secretary" are used
interchangeably.
4. Id. §§ 651(b)(3), 661(a). In this comment, the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission will be referred to as the "Commission," the "Review Commission," or
"OSHRC."
5. Id. § 651(a)(1).
6. Id. § 654(a)(2).
7. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) presented, but
did not resolve, the question whether the Act requires OSHA to compare costs and benefits
of a proposed standard reducing permissible levels of airborne benzene. The Court found
that the proposed lower standard was unenforceable because OSHA's rationale in lowering
it was not based on a finding that leukemia had ever been caused by exposure at that higher
limit. OSHA found rather that some leukemia might result from exposure at the higher level
and that leukemia might be eliminated if the exposure level were reduced. Id. at 2860. The
cost-benefit question was finally answered by the Supreme Court in American Textile Mfrs.
Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
8. See Continental Can Co. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1979); Williams Enter-
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I. THE ECONOMIC INFEASIBILITY ARGUMENT
The economic infeasibility of complying with toxic substance regula-
tions has been hotly debated in the courts,9 and has proved to be one of
the most controversial aspects of the Act. Employers vigorously object to
the frequently large investments required in order to comply with OSHA
regulations, whereas labor groups urge the view that the Act does not al-
ways go far enough to protect workers from industrial hazards.
The Commission has held that the word "feasible" should be inter-
preted to mean "technically possible," but should also include a compo-
nent of economic feasibility.10 Accordingly, it asserts that the costs of the
proposed controls should be balanced against the benefits to be derived
therefrom, so that resources will be allocated in relationship to the degree
of harm established.11 The Secretary, on the other hand, had been of the
opinion that economic factors related to compliance should be considered
only if the costs involved would seriously jeopardize the financial health
of the employer.1
2
The United States Supreme Court took a stand on the cost-benefit de-
bate in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan's in
which a statute regulating cotton dust exposure was attacked by cotton
industry representatives. The Court held that cost-benefit analysis by
OSHA in promulgating a standard under section 655(b)(5) of the Act" is
not required because Congress itself defined the basic relationship be-
tween costs and benefits by placing the "benefit" of the workers' health
above all other considerations, limited only by what is "capable of being
prises, Inc., [1980] OccuP. SAFETY AND HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 24,597.
9. E.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981); Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 649 (1980); Industrial Union Dep't v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
10. See RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 1979) (requiring Com-
mission to balance costs against benefits); Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82
(7th Cir. 1977) (requiring Commission to consider cost of implementation); Continental Can
Co., [1976-1977] Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 21,009 (placing burden of estab-
lishing economic and technical feasibility on Secretary).
11. RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1979). In order to com-
ply with noise standards, titanium producer would have been required to spend an esti-
mated $125,000. The court adopted a cost-benefit approach for determining economic feasi-
bility, and remanded the case to the OSHRC for application of this standard.
12. See RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1979); Continental Can Co.,
[1976-1977] Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 21,009.
13. 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5):
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents ... shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the ex-
tent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regu-
lar exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working
life.
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done." 5 In addition, section 652(8)16 does not incorporate a cost-benefit
requirement into section 655(b)(5) for standards dealing with toxic
materials or harmful physical agents. To interpret section 652(8) as im-
posing an additional and overriding cost-benefit analysis requirement on
the issuance of section 655(b)(5) standards would eviscerate the "to the
extent feasible" requirement 7 of section 655(b)(5).
The Court closely examined the Act's legislative history, and concluded
that Congress did not intend OSHA to conduct its own cost-benefit anal-
ysis before promulgating a toxic material or harmful physical agent stan-
dard. The Court found that the history reflected Congress' awareness that
the Act would create substantial costs for employers but that the intent
was to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe and healthful
working environment.18
The American Textile decision comes as a great blow to employers,
who can no longer argue that the Secretary has the burden of demon-
strating that the benefits of a particular regulation outweigh the costs of
its implementation. Once the Secretary establishes the general feasibility
of the standard, the employer must bear the entire weight of producing
substantial evidence that the benefits do not outweigh the costs of the
regulation in question, a task that is certain to prove difficult.
II. THE TECHNOLOGICAL INFEASIBILITY ARGUMENT
The employer often argues that compliance with an occupational health
standard is technologically infeasible. The burden of showing technologi-
cal feasibility remains with the Secretary, but may be rebutted by the
employer with substantial evidence to the contrary.19
Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA20 was a 1975 case chal-
15. 101 S. Ct. at 2490.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8). "The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a stan-
dard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means,
methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment." Id.
17. 101 S. Ct. at 2492.
18. Id. at 2495-96. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis, see Note, The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term: OSHA Regulation of Toxic Substances, 94 H~Av. L. REv. 75, 242-51
(1980); Comment, Cost-Benefit Analysis for Standards Regulating Toxic Substances Under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act: American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 60 B.U.
L. REv. 115 (1980); Comment, The Billion Dollar Benzene Blunder: Supreme Court Scruti-
nizes OSHA Standards in Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute, 16 TULSA L.J. 252 (1980).
19. Diversified Indus. Div., Independent Stave Co. v. OSHRC, 618 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir.
1980); Stabilized Pigments, Inc., [1980] Occup. SAFE'Y & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 24,160.
20. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). Manufacturers of vinyl
chloride and vinyl chloride products filed for review of health and safety regulations
promulgated by the Secretary. The court held that even though the ultimate facts in dispute
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lenging the Secretary's exposure limit for vinyl chloride on the basis that,
among other things, the technology did not then exist to achieve the very
low level required by the Act. The Second Circuit held that the Secretary
could establish an exposure limit that anticipated future advances in
technology, but did not imply that an employer could be found in viola-
tion of such a standard by failing to implement currently unavailable
technology. 2'
Technological infeasibility is closely tied to economic infeasibility, as
was illustrated in Samson Paper Bag Co., Inc.22 The Commission held
that engineering controls to reduce the noise generated by paper bag ma-
chines were technologically feasible, but the Commission could not agree
on the economic feasibility of the controls, and so remanded the case for
reconsideration under the cost-benefit criterion set forth in Continental
Can.2s
Earlier cases, however, did not necessarily consider economic feasibility
a controlling factor in the determination of feasibility in general. For ex-
ample, in Castle & Cooke Foods, 4 the Commission stated that the fact
that engineering methods presently exist to significantly reduce the noise
levels in a certain plant is sufficient to show that engineering controls are
technologically feasible, even though their implementation may require
custom design. In an action involving the review of a Commission order
vacating a textile manufacturer's citations for violations of noise regula-
tions, Marshall v. West Point Pepperell, Inc.,"5 the Fifth Circuit found
substantial evidence supporting the Commission's factual finding that
there were no feasible technological methods for significantly reducing
noise levels in the manufacturer's mill at the time the citations were is-
sued. However, the court stated that, by virtue of its extensive operations
and prominent position in the textile industry, the employer was obli-
gated to explore all reasonable opportunities for solving the loom noise
problem in a feasible manner. 26
It is apparent from these cases that the Commission and the courts are
are "on the frontiers of scientific knowledge," the duty of the Secretary is to act to protect
employees in circumstances where existing methodology is deficient. 509 F.2d at 1308.
21. 509 F.2d at 1309.
22. [1980] Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) V 24,555.
23. Id. 1 24,555 at 30,046. The Commission in Continental Can stated that were it to hold
that economic feasibility was irrelevant in enforcing a noise standard, the consequence
would be that the standard would be applied without any consideration ever having been
given to its economic consequences, either on a national basis or an industry-by-industry
basis, which would be inconsistent with Congressional intent. Continental Can Co., [1976-
1977] Occup. SAFrTY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 21,009 at 25,256. Cf. American Textile Mfrs.
Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
24. [1977-1978] Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 21,854.
25. 588 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1979).
26. Id. at 985.
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extremely willing to find that a particular regulation is technologically
feasible, but that this tendency has been counterbalanced by the imposi-
tion of the economic cost-benefit requirement. However, in light of the
American Textile decision, it is possible that reviewing bodies may be
forced to regard technological feasibility as an element for consideration
totally independent from economic feasibility.
I1I. THE IMPOSSMILITY OF COMPLIANCE DEFENSE
The Review Commission has also established the affirmative defense of
impossibility of compliance with the violated standard. The burden of
proving impossibility rests with the employer,2 7 and is an onerous burden.
In addition to demonstrating that compliance would be impossible or
would preclude work performance, the employer must show that there are
no alternative compliance methods.2 8 A showing of impracticability or in-
convenience has consistently been held to be inadequate to support an
impossibility defense.29 If full compliance is unachievable, there must be
substantial compliance so that as much protection as possible is afforded
the employee."0
The Geisler Ganz Corp."1 case illustrates the type of evidence an em-
ployer must produce in order to establish impossibility of compliance.
The employer had been cited and assessed a penalty for failure to guard
the point of operation on manually operated mechanical power presses
used to stamp out belt buckles and costume jewelry. A judge had previ-
ously vacated the citation on the ground that the Secretary failed to es-
tablish the feasibility of the guards; but that decision was remanded after
the Commission ruling in F.H. Lawson 2 that the burden of proof was on
the employer to establish the impossibility of compliance. The inspector
27. F.H. Lawson Co., [1980] Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 24,277 (employer did
not meet burden of demonstrating impossibility); Geisler Ganz Corp., [19801 OccuP. SAFETY
& HEALTH DEC. (CCH) S 24,775 (Commission satisfied that employer demonstrated impossi-
bility of designing adequate guards).
28. F.H. Lawson Co., [1980] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 24,277 at 29,574-75
(employer offered no proof of attempt to alter production methods and expended no effort
to develop guards for machines); M.J. Lee Construction Co., [1979] OccuP. SAFETY &
HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 23,330 (impossibility defense negated by evidence that acceptable
alternate method used after inspection).
29. E.g., Perlite of Houston, Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (Occu-
PATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) T 25,464; General Steel Fabricators, Inc., [1977-1978] Oc-
cuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1122,104; Taylor Bldg. Ass'ns, [1977-1978] OccuP. SAFETY
& HEALTH DEC. (CCH) S 21,592; K & T Steel Corp., [1975-1976] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH
DEC. (CCH) 1120,445; Sheet Metal Specialty Co., [1974-1975] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.
(CCH) 5 19,546.
30. Perlite of Houston, Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (OccuP. SAFETY &
HEALTH DEC.) 1 25,464 (failure to provide safety net; employee killed in fall).
31. [1980] Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 24,775.
32. Id. % 24,277.
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conceded that Geisler's operation was unique. Furthermore, the employer
had tried guards suggested by an insurance company and the New York
State Department of Labor, but both agreed that they were not feasible,
and both granted variances. Despite the fact that there was no past his-
tory, experience, or technical data upon which a determination could be
made that it was impossible to guard the point of operation, the citation
and penalty were vacated by the judge .3 Apparently, the judge was im-
pressed by the efforts made by the employer to comply with the standard
and the uniform conclusions of infeasibility reached by the employer's
outside consultants. Although this employer used the impossibility de-
fense successfully, in most cases where the defense has been tested it has
failed because the employer could not overcome the burden of showing
that it had no alternative means of compliance."
IV. GREATER HAZARD DEFENSE
Another affirmative defense available to the employer is that compli-
ance with the regulation would create a greater hazard than noncompli-
ance. Very few courts have discussed this issue, but it is clear that in
order to plead the greater hazard defense, the employer must show that
(1) the hazards of compliance are greater than the hazards of noncompli-
ance, (2) alternative means of protecting employees are unavailable, and
(3) a variance application would be inappropriate.35
In Donovan v. Royal Logging Co.,36 the employer was cited for a gen-
eral duty clause violation3 7 and for a failure to require the use of seat
33. Id. 24,775.
34. See Perlite of Houston, Inc. [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HI-EAL GUIDE (CCH) (Occup.
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) 1 25,464 (skylight opening guards were available but were not used);
Mississippi River Grain Elevator, Inc., [1981] 3 EMnL. SAFETY & HEALTH GumE (CCH) (Oc-
cup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) 25,041 (employer failed to show that new machine with im-
proved safety features was not on market at time of inspection); Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
[1980] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 24,708 (expert witness admitted it was possi-
ble to guard point of operation with pullback restraints); Masonry Contractors, Inc., [1980]
OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 24,338 (compliance with guarding requirement not
functionally impossible); S & H Riggers and Erectors, Inc., [1979] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH
DEC. (CCH) 1 23,480 (employer did not demonstrate alternate means of protection
unavailable).
35. See, e.g., H.S. Holtze Constr. Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 149, 152 (8th Cir. 1980);
Noblecraft Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 614 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1980); General Electric
Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 576 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1978).
A variance application is an order issued by the Secretary stating that the employer has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the methods it uses or proposes will
provide as safe and healthful an environment as those methods required by the standard.
See, 29 U.S.C. § 655(d).
36. 645 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1981).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) requires the employer to provide a working environment free
from recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious harm.
[Vol. 16:485
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belts3" which resulted in the death of a logger whose tractor rolled over on
him. The employer di d not require its loggers to wear the seat belts in
their tractors because the belts would hinder them in avoiding the debris
often hurled into the cab during logging operations. The Secretary argued
that construction industry seat belt requirements applied to the logging
industry as well, and that the burden was therefore on the employer to
show a greater hazard by compliance with the requirement. The employer
asserted that construction industry protective equipment standards were
not applicable to the logging industry, and then presented specific evi-
dence regarding the dangers of the debris thrown into the cab.39
Whether the greater hazard defense existed or was appropriate in a
general duty clause violation proceeding was a question of first impres-
sion for the Ninth Circuit. The court agreed with the Review Commission
finding that the employer had rebutted the Secretary's feasibility showing
with evidence of a greater hazard. 0 The court agreed with the Commis-
sion that the greater hazard by compliance defense does not apply in gen-
eral duty clause proceedings as a rebuttal. Rather, the Secretary has the
burden of showing that the proposed safety measure will not result in a
greater hazard as part of his obligation to demonstrate feasibility.41
The court in Royal Logging commented that "[a]lthough feasibility re-
quires that a measure be technologically and economically possible, the
Secretary must also prove the utility and practicality of the precaution.' 42
The standard for judging the safety measure is whether safety experts
familiar with the pertinent industry agree that it meets these criteria.48
This requires OSHA and the Review Commission to consider prevailing
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) reads: "The employer is responsible for requiring the wearing
of appropriate personal protective equipment in all operations where there is an exposure to
hazardous conditions or where this part indicates the need for using such equipment to
reduce the hazards to the employees."
39. 645 F.2d at 830-31. The administrative law judge concluded that § 1926.28 does not
apply to the logging industry, but found that Royal violated the general duty clause by not
requiring operators of tractors not exposed to debris to wear seat belts. The Commission
affirmed but broadened the exemption to include all operators exposed to debris. The court
held that employer did violate the general duty clause, despite its showing of greater
hazard.
40. 645 F.2d at 830.
41. Id. Since the greater hazard defense does not belong in a general duty clause violation
proceeding, it apparently was not allowed by the court.
42. Id. The court held that the Secretary failed to show the utility of seat belt use on
tractors in the logging industry. Substantial unrebutted evidence supported the Commis-
sion's finding that the wearing of seat belts in cats encountering debris exposes workers to a
hazard commensurate with the rollover hazard.
43. See also Voegle Co. v. OSHRC, 625 F.2d 1075, 1080 (3d Cir. 1980); Magma Copper
Co. v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1979); General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599
F.2d 453, 464 (1st Cir. 1979); National Realty and Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d
1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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industry customs and practices,44 although they are not necessarily
dispositive.
S & H Riggers and Erectors, Inc.,45 used the "reasonable man" test to
circumvent the employer's industry custom and greater hazard argument.
The Commission held that a judge properly affirmed two safety belt
charges involving employees at the roof levels of two buildings who were
guiding crane-lifted concrete panels into position. The employer argued
that the use of safety belts would hinder the employees' movement and
prevent them from evading swinging panels. The Commission rejected
this greater hazard defense because there was little likelihood of tied-off
employees being crushed by falling or swinging panels.' 6 Although the
particular installation method may have been common practice in the in-
dustry, "a reasonable person familiar with the circumstances surrounding
the alleged violations would have recognized hazards warranting the use
of personal protective equipment.'
4 7
In arriving at its decision in S & H Riggers, the Commission declined to
follow the Fifth Circuit decision in B & B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHC4'
which held that the Commission must not disregard industry custom in
its application of the reasonable person test.4 9 In S & H Riggers the Com-
mission stated that it continued to adhere to its interpretation of section
1926.28(a) requiring personal protective equipment because the court's
interpretation in B & B Insulation, Inc. would permit "industry to con-
tinue unsafe work practices by failing to protect against known hazards.
Consistent with the purposes of the Act, industry may not set its own
standard of reasonableness, when there are 'precautions so imperative
that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.' ,5
The Fifth Circuit recently reversed the Review Commission's decision,
holding that in order to establish personal protective equipment viola-
tions, due process required a showing that employers either had failed to
provide personal protective equipment customarily required in the indus-
try or had actual knowledge that such equipment was required under the
44. 645 F.2d at 830. See also Tube-Lok Products, [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH Gums
(CCH) (Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) 1 25,235.
45. [1980] Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 24,336.
46. Id. 24,336 at 29,652.
47. Id. 24,336 at 29,651.
48. 583 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978).
49. Id. With respect to an interpretation of § 1926.28(a), the court in B & B Insulation
had stated that "[w]here the reasonable man is used to interpolate specific duties from gen-
eral OSHA regulations, the character and purposes of the Act suggest a closer identification
between the projected behavior of the reasonable man and the customary practice of em-
ployers in the industry." Id. at 1370.
50. [1980] Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 24,336 at 29,651 n.9 (quoting T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932)).
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particular circumstances8 1 Here, there was insufficient evidence that S &
H Riggers had actual knowledge that personal protective equipment was
called for under the circumstances.5 2 The court reaffirmed its decision in
B & B Insulation, stating that the Secretary cannot impose standards
more stringent than those customarily followed in an industry under the
broad language of section 1926.28(a) because of these due process consid-
erations.5 3 The court further pointed out that under the Review Commis-
sion's approach, upon a finding by the Commission that safety equipment
should be used which is not customarily being employed in an industry,
the Commission may simply declare that industry practice is not control-
ling and find a violation of section 1926.28(a). If the Commission and in-
dustry disagree as to the need for personal protective equipment under
particular circumstances, industry standards, as a matter of law, would be
deemed unreasonable. This the court would not accept.5
In another circuit court decision reversing a Review Commission deci-
sion, a greater hazard by compliance was successfully argued. 5 The em-
ployer had been cited for failing to provide full protection to employees
working on an open-sided floor more than nineteen feet above the ground.
The court, examining the three criteria for establishing a greater hazard
defense, determined that they did not apply in this case because a tempo-
rary hazard was in issue, not a permanent hazard such as an unguarded
radial saw blade side . 5 The court held that the substantial evidence did
not support the Commission's finding of a violation, inasmuch as the very
reason for the employees working on an open-sided floor was to erect an
exterior wall which would serve as the functional equivalent of the stan-
dard guardrail required by the regulations. 57 The court concluded by call-
ing for "a reasonable interpretation of the purpose of the Act.158
The only successful greater hazard case which involves occupational
health rather than safety is Ralston Purina Co.59 The employer was cited
for exposing pet food factory workers to excessive levels of noise. How-
ever, the court found that the acoustical wall tiles suggested by the Secre-
tary to abate the noise level violation "would be difficult to clean and
would provide space to harbor salmonella organisms .. .which in turn
could contaminate the pet food being produced."60
51. S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 659 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1981).
52. Id. at 1284.
53. Id. at 1282.
54. Id. at 1281.
55. H.S. Holtze Constr. Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 149 (8th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 152.
57. Id. at 151-52.
58. Id. at 152.
59. [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.)
25,444.
60. Id. 25,444 at 31,718.
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The greater hazard defense provides the employer with a more success-
ful argument than the impossibility defense, not because the criteria are
any less onerous, but because the reviewing bodies view the greater haz-
ard defense in a more subjective light and are, therefore, more willing to
find a greater hazard than to find an impossibility of compliance.
V. EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT DEFENSE
The employee misconduct defense may be asserted successfully when
the employer can demonstrate that: (1) all feasible steps were taken to
avoid the occurrence of the hazard,"1 including the training of employ-
ees,62 informing them of the dangers involved,' and adequately supervis-
ing the work site;6 ' and (2) the actions of the employee were a violation of
a. uniformly and effectively communicated and enforced work rule, and
that the employer had neither active nor constructive knowledge of the
violation. 5
While an employer is not an insurer under the general duty clause, the
employer is responsible for a safety violation if he knew or, with the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence, should have known, of the existence of the
hazard. 6 The Secretary is not required to prove by direct evidence that
the employer had actual knowledge of the violation where the record indi-
cates that the employer did not properly train and supervise his
employees.
6 7
Thus, in General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 8 the First Circuit noted
that when the employer's defense is that the hazard occurred as a result
of unauthorized and idiosyncratic behavior by its employees, the issue of
the employer's training and supervision of its employees automatically
arises as part of the employer's showing that he took all feasible steps to
avoid the occurrence of the hazard. 9 Moreover, a "showing by the em-
ployer that it has an adequate and effectively enforced safety program,
61. H.B. Zachry Co. v. OSHRC, 638 F.2d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 1981). See also General Dy-
namics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 458 (1st Cir. 1979).
62. 638 F.2d at 818; Home Plumbing and Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564, 569 (5th
Cir. 1976).
63. 638 F.2d at 818-19. An employer has a duty to warn its employees when they will be
handling hazardous material. Pittson Stevedoring Corp., [1980] Occup. SAFET & HEALTH
DEC. (CCH) 24,532. However, the Secretary is not required to promulgate regulations
which would compel employers to inform employees of the levels and identities of all toxic
substances in their workplace. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Marshall, 485 F.
Supp. 845, 847 (D.D.C. 1980).
64. See General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 465 (1st Cir. 1979); Ames
Crane & Rental Serv., Inc. v. Dunlop, 532 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1976).
65. 638 F.2d at 818-19.
66. 599 F.2d at 458.
67. 638 F.2d at 818.
68. 599 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1979).
69. Id. at 459.
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gives rise to the inference that the employer's reliance on employees to
comply with applicable safety rules is justifiable; violations then are not
forseeable or preventable. 70 However, informal and infrequently en-
forced safety rules are inadequate to trigger this inference. 71
The Fifth Circuit followed this reasoning in Brown & Root, Inc. v.
OSHRC,72 where the employer disregarded a safety standard calling for
backup alarms on caterpillar tractors with an obstructed rear view, but
initiated no alternative work rules, relying instead on constant repetition
of the warning "be careful" as its only safety measure. A foreman was
struck and killed by one of these tractors as it was moving in reverse. The
court concluded that the employer's failure to comply with the safety
standard caused its employee misconduct defense to fail, because the em-
ployer did not prove that the employee's act was the result of idiosyn-
cratic behavior "which contravened company policy and practice."73
An isolated employee misconduct defense was also rejected where the
OSHA inspector observed numerous violations on the work site.74 In ad-
dition to the observations of the inspector, an employee testified that he
did not always tie off his safety belt, and had seen other employees wear-
ing safety belts without tying them off. Therefore, the "unpreventability"
aspect of the defense was not sustained by the evidence.7 5
Where even the supervisors at a job site do not comply with the em-
ployer's safety rules under the Act, the odds are even greater that an em-
ployee misconduct defense will not be successful. The Fifth Circuit in H.
B. Zachry Co. v. OSHRC76 upheld a Review Commission decision which
70. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. OSHRC, 623 F.2d 155, 157 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980)
(supervisory employee who did not wear available rubber gloves was electrocuted).
71. See, e.g., H.B. Zachry Co. v. OSHRC, 638 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1981); Abild Builders,
Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.)
25,447; Prestressed Systems, Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (OccuP.
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) 25,358.
72. 639 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1981).
73. Id. at 1293. The employer also argued that there was no specific showing of employee
access to the hazard. The court responded that the Review Commission is not required to
show "that a given employee was actually endangered by the unsafe condition, but only that
it was reasonably certain that some employee was or would be exposed to that danger." Id.
at 1294. The court then noted that the goal of the Act was "to prevent the first accident, not
to serve as a source of consolation for the first victim or his survivors." Id. See also Murphy
Pacific Marine Salvage Co., [1974-19751 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 19,205.
74. Prestressed Systems, Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (OccuP.
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) 1 25,358 (employer failed to enforce rules requiring tying-off safety
belts).
75. Id. See Del-Cook Lumber Co., [1976-1977] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1
21,088. Recent decisions have adhered to the same strict standard of enforcement of safety
rules. E.g., R. Zoppo Co., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFErY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (OccuP. SAFETY &
HEALTH DEC.) 1 25,230; CSY Yacht Corp., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH)
(Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) 25,348.
76. 638 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1981).
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found serious deficiencies in the communication and enforcement of
safety rules. The employee involved in the fatal electrocution of another
employee testified that he had skipped approximately half of the em-
ployer's regular safety meetings. The behavior of the supervisor also indi-
cated a lack of familiarity with the rules, because he had failed to instruct
the employee in a vital procedure which might have prevented the acci-
dent. The court reasoned that "the behavior of supervisory personnel sets
an example at the workplace, [and] an employer has . . .a heightened
duty to ensure the proper conduct of such personnel. 77 Focusing on re-
corded evidence of the employer's safety program and finding it deficient,
the court rejected the employee misconduct defense.78
The Review Commission has taken a strict stand on the issue of disci-
plining employees who refuse to comply with safety and health rules re-
garding personal protective equipment. For example, in Wallace Roofing
Co.,70 it reversed an administrative law judge's ruling that beyond daily
cautioning, an employer need not dismiss the employee or dock his pay in
order to comply with the Act. 0 The Commission agreed with the Secre-
tary that the Act imposes on employers a duty of compliance that cannot
be delegated to employees. The employee cannot be permitted an "indi-
vidual variance to set his own standard of care." '81
Wallace Roofing argued that the real issue is whether an employer
must discharge or suspend the offending employee for that employee's
repeated failure to wear protective equipment required by the Act. The
Review Commission held that in light of the employer's awareness of the
ineffectiveness of oral reprimands in preventing the employee's exposure
to a known hazard, further disciplinary action should have been taken.82
Because this unspecified disciplinary action could have prevented the vio-
lation, the employee misconduct defense failed.
Wallace Roofing further argued that holding the employer responsible
for the employee's refusal to wear personal protective equipment would
be an imposition of strict liability for employee misconduct.83 However,
the Act states that "employers and employees have separate but depen-
dent responsibilities and rights with respect to achieving safe and health-
ful working conditions." An employer has a duty to prevent and sup-
77. Id. at 819 (citing National Realty and Constr. Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257,
1267 n.38 (5th Cir. 1973)). See also Floyd S. Pike Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. OSHRC, 576 F.2d
72, 77 (5th Cir. 1978).
78. 638 F.2d at 819.
79. [1980] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) V 24,515.
80. Wallace Roofing Co., [1977-1978] OCCUP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 21,997.
81. [1980] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) s 24,515 at 29,973.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2) (1975).
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press hazardous conduct by employees, and "this duty is not qualified by
such common law doctrines as assumption of risk, contributory negli-
gence, or comparative negligence. 8 5 Therefore, final responsibility for
compliance remains with the employer.8 6 When faced with a situation
where an employee habitually disregards safety measures, the employer
should, at the minimum, anticipate that the employee will continue to
disregard the safety rules, and should either remove him from the partic-
ular task or more closely supervise his work.8 7
It is important for the employer to communicate its safety rules to all
those who might be exposed to a hazard if a rule is breached.8 8 However,
the Commission has recognized that training may be unnecessary for a
employee who is wholly disassociated from the operation in question, and
who would not be foreseeably exposed to danger.89
Although the employee misconduct defense does not appear to have
been raised in any occupational disease cases, it has been successfully ar-
gued in the area of occupational safety. For example, where the employer
had an extensive safety program and monitored the safety records of its
foremen, the Commission found the employer not responsible for a fore-
man's misconduct which caused his death.90 Another case similarly held
that an employer who had provided extensive on-the-job training and had
85. National Realty and Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
One right the employee does have, however, is to choose not to perform his assigned task
because of a "reasonable apprehension of death or serious injury, coupled with a reasonable
belief that no less drastic alternative is available." Whirlpool Corp. v. OSHRC, 445 U.S. 1,
3-4 (1980). For related law review articles, see Drapkin, The Right to Refuse Hazardous
Work after Whirlpool, 4 INDUS. REL. L. J. 29 (1980); Howard, Hazardous Substances in the
Workplace: Implications for the Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 798
(1981); Yerian, The Supreme Court Chooses Employee Safety in OSHA, 10 CAP. U. L. REV.
191 (1980).
86. Loomis International, Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (OccuP.
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) T 25,435 (employee cautioned frequently but no formal action taken
against him). The argument that attempts at compliance have been thwarted by concerted
refusals and by threats of strike or work stoppages by employees has been rejected, at least
regarding hard hat standards. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., [1975-1976] OccuP. SAFETY
& HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 20,577.
87. Loomis International, Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (Occup.
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) 25,435.
88. Stuttgart Mach. Works, Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (OccuP.
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) T 25,216.
89. Brennan v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1974) (employer's instruction to stay
away from trucks unloading packaged railroad ties sufficient; employer could not have fore-
seen that employee would cut band holding ties together prior to unloading, thereby causing
his death).
90. Houston Sys. Mfg. Co., Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (OccuP.
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.) 25,466. The Commission held that employer, a builder of offshore
drilling platforms, was not responsible for an experienced foreman's operation of his crane
within ten feet of high voltage lines. The foreman had had no previous accidents, and all of
employer's cranes were equipped with warning signs.
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established an effective procedure for the safe handling of an industrial
gun could not have foreseen or prevented an employee's misconduct
which resulted in the gun firing and fatally injuring him.9 1 Thus, only by
showing a well-communicated and enforced safety program can an em-
ployer's affirmative defense of isolated employee misconduct succeed.
VI. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A common law defense recognized by the Review Commission is collat-
eral estoppel. This doctrine has been asserted in several cases involving
occupational health and essentially operates to bar the relitigation of a
factual issue which has been settled in an earlier proceeding. The leading
case in this area is Continental Can Co. v. Marshall,92 in which the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed an injunction enjoining the Secretary from prose-
cuting pending noise violation charges and from issuing future noise cita-
tions at defendant's can manufacturing plants. The Commission had
ruled earlier93 that noise control costs estimated at $33,500,000 for the
employer's eighty plants were economically infeasible. Evidence concern-
ing the employer's economic status was offered in that case and deter-
mined in favor of the employer. As a result of that litigation, the circuit
court in Continental Can II held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
applied, and that citing physically similar individual plants for the same
violation and thereby requiring the employer to relltigate the same issues
each time would amount to harassment.9 4
Using similar reasoning, a court refused to apply collateral estoppel to a
situation in which the employer argued that he had already been cited for
similar violations at the same locations, but failed to show a factual iden-
tity between the work place in prior proceedings and the instant case. 95
Because there had been changes in the legal climate regarding the
steelworking industry, the Commission, in Williams Enterprises, Inc.,"
declined to apply either collateral estoppel or res judicata. The employer
had been found to be in violation of personal protective equipment stan-
dards for its employees working up to ninbty feet above ground. He ar-
gued that the issue of whether these particular standards applied to steel
91. Koppers Co., Inc., [1981] 3 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) (OccuP. SAFETY &
HEALTH DEC.) 25,471. A worker was killed when the lanyard of the trigger mechanism
trailing on the floor caught on a drain and the gun discharged. The gun had never before
been left unattended or improperly transported, and there had been no accident involving
the gun in twenty-three years of operation.
92. 603 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1979).
93. Continental Can Co., [1976-1977] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 21,009.
94. 603 F.2d at 596-97. The court determined that each of the 80 can manufacturing
plants uses the same machines to make the same product, and thus produces the same noise
hazard. Id. at 593.
95. ASARCO, Inc., [1979] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 23,695.
96. [1980] OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 24,597.
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erection had been tried in earlier cases and decided in the employer's
favor. The Commission held, however, that relitigation was justified be-
cause those cases were decided in 1975 and 1976, and there had been sig-
nificant developments in the applicable legal principles upon which they
were based."'
Collateral estoppel, although not used often, may be seen more fre-
quently in situations involving highly mechanized industries, or employ-
ers with numerous plants struggling to maintain their facilities with up-
to-date equipment which complies with OSHA standards.
VII. CONCLUSION
As was illustrated in the cases discussed herein, the Act has served to
protect employers from arbitrary OSHA violations by shifting certain
burdens of proof onto the Secretary. In this manner, the Act serves to
strike a balance by alleviating unfair evidentiary burdens which might
otherwise fall on the employer.
However, despite the Commission's recognition of several affirmative
defenses, it is readily apparent that the employer seldom wins a battle.
This is true because each defense either involves one element employers
can never seem to establish, or because the reviewing bodies find some
extenuating factor that causes it to fail. Moreover, the employer is un-
likely to obtain reversal of an unfavorable decision on appeal to a circuit
court because the standard of review is "to treat the Commission's inter-
pretations of OSHA with deference and.., not overturn those interpre-
tations where they are reasonable and consistent with the purposes of
OSHA."""
Therefore, by not favoring employers' pocketbooks or convenience, the
Act does accomplish its purpose of protecting employee health and safety.
In the long run, if the American Textile decision is interpreted broadly,
the judicial climate will remain one which is in favor of protecting em-
ployee safety and health above all else.
Janice G. Murphy
97. Id. 1 24,597, at 30,193. The "significant legal developments" apparently refer to the
Commission's refusal to follow a strict industry custom test, instead applying a higher stan-
dard than common practice.
98. Bratton Corp. v. OSHRC, 590 F.2d 273, 276 (8th Cir. 1979).
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